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THE PITFALLS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE
ROAD AHEAD: THE RETURN OF THE
LIVING INFLATION IN LATIN AMERICA?
Mauricio Baquero-Herrera*
ABSTRACT
First, I would like to thank the Director of the SMU John Goodwin
Tower Center for Political Studies as well as Professor Joseph Norton and
the organizers for inviting me to participate as a panelist at the A Jno. E.
Owens Memorial Foundation Conference entitled "Trade Integration in the
Americas: Revisiting the Washington Consensus." The third session of this
event deals with the "Legal and Institutional Dimensions of Reform."
As we all know, during the 1980s, all Latin American economies suf-
fered from the syndrome of hyperinflation. Therefore, one of the main
policies suggested by the Washington consensus was to gain
macroeconomic stability as a precondition for the success of the other eco-
nomic policies recommended. It was achieved by means of establishing
independent Central Banks and by constraining the heavy expenditure of
the governments at that time. Such structural reforms were carried out dur-
ing the 1990s through constitutional and legal reforms. As a result, inflation
was significantly reduced in the region. But, due to the interesting and rad-
ical political changes that are going on in Latin America, it seems that there
is a trend to reduce or even to remove Central Banks' autonomy. Will it
mean the return of the living inflation?
I. MAIN POLICIES OF THE 1989 WASHINGTON CONSENSUS:
THE SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC STABILITY
HE countries of the Andean region (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Bolivia) as well as the rest of Latin America and the
Caribbean were affected by turbulent macroeconomic environ-
ments involving volatile terms of trade and real exchange rates. The
whole region has had a long history of macroeconomic instability that has
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partially resulted from unstable fiscal and monetary policies and the
adoption of unsustainable exchange rate regimes.1 In most Latin Ameri-
can countries, these circumstances have been a critical factor restraining
economic development.2
Following the external debt crisis of the 1980s and the strategies
adopted to bring economic stability to the region, there was political will
to implement structural reforms throughout Latin America. Interna-
tional financial institutions such the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank began to play a supervisory role conditioning their
loans on economic policy reform of the debtors.3
The IMF reform programs put into practice in Latin America focused
on policies aimed at gaining macroeconomic stability to the region. The
policies that were emphasized are: "[1] reduction in the budget deficit to
limit inflation, local interest rates and the need for foreign borrowing; [2]
limits on domestic credit expansion to control inflation; [3] exchange rate
devaluations to discourage imports and encourage exports; and [4] limits
on borrowing consistent with the debtor's capacity to pay."' 4 Apart from
reducing the size and role of local governments, IMF structural adjust-
ments also focused on curtailing protectionism as opposed to the so-
called Washington consensus 5 which supported "economic growth . . .
promoted through unilateral tariff cuts and reduction in import restric-
tions."'6 The neo-liberal policies introduced at the domestic level led to
the opening of Latin American markets that, at some point, shared the
same market-oriented economic policies.
As shown in tables one and two, during the 1990s, countries in the re-
gion recorded significant advances in the area of macroeconomic stability
by implementing structural reforms focused on achieving better alloca-
tions of resources.7 Certainly, the disastrous macroeconomic phenome-
non of hyperinflation in the 1980s, as well as the practice of using
1. See SHAHID JAVED BURKI & GUILLERMO PERRY, THE LONG MARCH: A REFORM
AGENDA FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE NEXT DECADE 1
(1997).
2. Anoop Singh et al., Stabilization and Reform in Latin America: A Macroeconomic
Perspective on the Experience Since the Early 1990s, IMF OCCASIONAL PAPER,
Feb. 2005, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/238/index.htm, (last visited Apr.
9, 2008) [hereinafter IMF 2005].
3. Policies imposed included: "[1] reduction in the budget deficit to limit inflation,
local interest rates and the need for foreign borrowing; [2] limits on domestic
credit expansion to control inflation; [3] exchange rate devaluations to discourage
imports and encourage exports; [4] limits on borrowing consistent with the
debtor's capacity to pay." Ross P. BUCKLEY, Emerging Markets Debt: An Analy-
sis of the Secondary Market 32 (1999).
4. Id. "Other structural adjustments included: 1) Higher income and sales taxes. 2)
Higher charges for state-produced goods and services such as electricity and water.
3) Privatisation of state-owned companies. 4) Deregulation of the labour market."
Id.
5. John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Con-
sensus?, 15WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 251, 251-64 (2000).
6. See BUCKLEY supra note 3, at 32.
7. See IMF 2005, supra note 2.
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monetary expansion to finance public expenditure and fiscal deficit, have
almost disappeared or have been heavily reduced in the region. 8 In addi-
tion, budget balances, fiscal savings, and the quantum and diversification
of exports have improved considerably. 9 Privatization has also exper-
ienced widespread growth throughout Latin America.10
The evidence found by the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) in 199711 suggested that countries in the region that imple-
mented deeper structural reforms experienced greater reductions in
macroeconomic volatility. But such volatility during the 1990s "was very
high by international standards and their own historical standards in sev-
eral major countries, including Argentina, Mexico, and Peru, all major
reformers. ' 12 The World Bank, in its 2005 report concerning Latin
America and the Caribbean region, concluded that macroeconomic insta-
bility is the third most-reported constraint to private investment, pre-
ceded by policy uncertainty and corruption. 13
In February 2005, the Managing Director of the IMF,14 pointing to the
challenges and opportunities of Latin America in the macroeconomic
front, said that policymakers in the region still "need to keep their eyes
on": 1) "[m]aintaining appropriate public debt levels" as a reduction in
debt levels would ease existing vulnerabilities and increase the scope for
flexible fiscal responses to macroeconomic shocks; 2) "[b]alancing spend-
ing and capital investment," cutting on spending in nonessential areas and
increasing investments in infrastructure, health, and education; and 3)
"keeping inflation in check."' 15 "[T]he prime objective of monetary policy
should be to lock in and strengthen" the substantial progress made in the
last ten years in the region.1 6
Overall, as a result of the implementation of structural reforms and
economic stabilization policies, Latin America is a less economically vola-
tile region.1 7 Such achievement would not have been reached without the
8. See RICHARDO FFRENCH-DAVIS, Reforming the Reforms in Latin America:
Macroeconomics, Trade, Finance 5 (2000).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Michael Gavin, A Decade of Reform in Latin America: Has It Delivered Lower
Volatility? 1, 15 (Inter-American Dev. Bank, Working Paper Green Series #349,
1997).
12. Id. Gavin's work suggests that Latin America's record of economic instability, as
measured by real output growth and changes in the real exchange rate, can be
explained by three main factors: (1) Instability in the external environment; (2)
unstable monetary and fiscal policies, and (3) Some aspects of the policy regime.
Id.
13. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVESTMENT
CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE (2005).
14. Rodrigo de Rato, Managing Dir., IMF, Remarks: Latin America in the Global
Economy-Challenges and Opportunities (Feb. 4, 2005), http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/speeches/2005/020405.htm, (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Gavin, supra note 9; see also Ben S. Bernanke, Member, Board of Governors,
U.S. Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Re-
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commitment of the governments to do so. 18 Certainly, as the President of
the IADB stated in 2002, "there is genuine political will in the region to
deepen interdependence and reduce volatility." 19 Such certainty led him
to propose and conduct the bank towards introducing programs of
macroeconomic cooperation in the region.20
II. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND MACROECONOMIC
STABILITY UNTIL 2005: INDEPENDENT
CENTRAL BANKS
During the 1990s, an important trend towards granting independence
to the central banks from the Andean governments took place in the sub-
region.21 As summarized in table three, constitutional and legal reforms
were carried out with the aim of providing an adequate framework for
the independence of the central banks to perform their functions, espe-
cially those related to the formulation of monetary policy, interest, and
exchange rate regimes. 22 This section, therefore, studies the reforms im-
plemented in the 1990s. But, it is important to note that some Andean
countries have started back pedaling such reforms in 2006, as is acknowl-
edged in part III.
Generally, the Andean countries used constitutional amendments to
incorporate regulatory frameworks for their central banks' independence.
But, in the case of Bolivia, the political constitution of the state does not
have a special rule to that effect. In this Andean country, the constitution
only establishes that the state is in charge of determining the monetary,
banking, and credit policies aimed at improving the conditions of the na-
tional economy.23 It also ascertains that the state controls the monetary
reserves. 24 The Law of the Central Bank of Bolivia promulgated in 1995
determines the powers, scope, and degree of independence of the central
search Economic Summit: Inflation in Latin America-a New Era? (Feb. 11, 2005),
http://www.bis.org/review/r050216g.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).
18. See Bernanke, supra note 17.
19. Press Release, Inter-American Development Bank, Is Macroeconomic Coordina-
tion Desirable and Possible in Latin America? (Sept. 26, 2002).
20. See id.
21. For more discussions on the issue of central bank independence, see Rosa M. Las-
tra, European Monetary Union and Central Bank Independence, EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC AND MONETARY UNION: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 289, 299-329
(Mads Andenas et al. ed., 1997); ROSA M. LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING AND
BANKING REGULATION (1996); Rose Lastra & Geoffery Wood, Governance in
Central Bank Independence & Accountability, 10 CENT. BANKING J. 34-39 (1999-
2000); Clive G. Briault et al., Independence and Accountability (1995), http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/foi/discO50628d.pdf, (last visited Feb. 2,
2008); RENE SMITS, The European Central Bank 152-61 (1997).
22. COMITI LATINOAMERICANO DE AsuNTos FINANCIEROS, INDEPENDENCIA DEL
BANCO CENTRAL LA OPCION ACERTADA PARA AMERICA LATINA ( 2001); see
also Salomon Kalmanovitz, La Independencia del Banco Central y la Democracia
en Am6rica Latina, http://www.hacer.org/pdf/ibc.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
23. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLIC DE BOLIVIA art. 143. It is important to note that
the Constitution of Bolivia was changed in December 2007.
24. Id.
2009] PITFALLS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE ROAD AHEAD 191
bank. 25
The Central Bank of Bolivia is an institution of the state, governed by
public law and with economic self-sufficiency. 26 It is a legal entity with its
own capital and has an indefinite term. The bank is the only monetary
and exchange authority in the country with the purpose to preserve mon-
etary stability. 27 To that end, it has administrative, technical, and finan-
cial competences as well as legal capacity to enact specialized regulation
of general application. Within the scope of its powers, the bank issues
general policies regarding monetary, foreign exchange, and payment sys-
tem,28 while taking into consideration the economic policy of the govern-
ment.29 Generally, the central bank is forbidden to extend credit to or
extend guarantee to the public sector.30 All financial intermediaries and
financial services providers are under the scope of its powers.3 1 In this
sense, Central Bank of Bolivia is a regulator 32 of the financial institutions
as well as the superintendent of banks and other financial institutions.33
In effect, it performs roles of both the regulator and the supervisor.
The main authority of the Central Bank of Bolivia is its Directorate. It
is responsible for defining the bank's policies, issuing specialized rules of
general application, and internal rules of the bank. The President of Bo-
livia elects the President of the Bank and five other Directors, who form
the Directorate, from a list of three candidates provided by the Bolivian
Congress. 34
As defined by the law, the Central Bank of Bolivia is an institution of
the executive branch.3 5 Therefore, it is obligated to report periodically to
(or when requested by) the Bolivian President on the evolution of the
monetary, exchange, credit, and banking situation of the country.36 The
results of its monetary, exchange, credit, and banking policies must be
reported to the President on an annual basis. 37 In addition, within the
first 120 days of every year, the Central Bank must present the annual
report of the institution, including the results of its policies, to the Presi-
dent, the Congress, and the Comptroller General. 38
25. LEY DEL BANCO CENTRAL DE BOLIVIA [LCBB].
26. Article 1 of the LCBB defines de Central Bank as an autarkic institution. Art. 41,
however, defines it as an institution of the executive power being accountable to
the President of Bolivia. Id. at arts. 1, 43.
27. Id. at art. 2.
28. Id. at art. 3.
29. Id. at art. 4.
30. Id. at art. 22.
31. Id. at art. 30.
32. Id. at arts. 38-40.
33. Law of Banks and Financial Institutions N0 1488 arts. 152-159 (1993), amended by
Law No. 2297 (2001).
34. See LCBB, supra note 25, at art. 45.
35. Id. at art. 1. LCBB, however, defines it as an institution of the State with autarkic
nature. See supra note 26. This contradiction certainly limits the scope of indepen-
dency of the Bolivian Central Bank.
36. Id.
37. Id. at art. 41.
38. Id. at art. 42.
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In case of Colombia, the constitution of 1991 introduced various re-
forms to the central banking system. The Banco de la Repliblica is the
Central Bank of Colombia. It is an organization independent of the other
branches of government, is organized as a legal entity with public jurisdic-
tion, and acts "with administrative, patrimonial, and technical autonomy,
subject to its own legal regime. '39 Article 372 of the Colombian Consti-
tution entrusted the Congress with the duty of enacting the law that regu-
lates the functioning of the bank and "the regulations under which the
government will issue the statutes of the Bank."'40 It was achieved
through Law 32 of 1992.41 In this sense, the Colombian Congress and not
the executive determines the framework governing the scope of the
bank's function and internal structure.
The board of directors of the bank is the Colombian "monetary, ex-
change, and credit authority [that] represent[s] interest of the nation ex-
clusively" 42 The board acts independently from the government. It is
composed of seven members- the Minister of Finance who is also the
chairperson, 43 the governor of the bank elected by the board, and five
permanent, full-time members appointed by the President for a term of
four years.
44
One of the priorities of the board of directors is to control inflation.
Preserving the purchasing power of the currency is the principal objective
of the bank, as a constitutional rule.45 Under normal circumstances, the
bank can extend credit only to financial intermediaries undergoing tem-
porary problems of liquidity or a shortage of resources. It is forbidden to
extend credit to the private sector or to the Government, except under
special circumstances. 46 The bank is accountable to the Congress. "It is
39. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLUMBIA art. 371, translated in
UNIV. OF RICHMOND CONSTITUTION FINDER (unofficial translation), http://con-
finder.richmond.edu/ [hereinafter CCN].
40. Id. at art. 372.
41. Ley 31 de 1992 [LBRC]. This law determines, among other things, the form of the
bank's organization, its legal regime, the functioning of its executive board and its
board of directors, the term of the director, the rules for the constitution of its
reserves; including rules for exchange and monetary stabilization, and the future
application of its earnings.
42. See CCN, supra note 38, at art. 372. These functions must be exercised in coordina-
tion with the general economic policy
43. This appointment is aimed at harmonizing the policies of the bank and the
government.
44. Id. When the new Constitution was adopted, it was agreed that at the end of the
first four year term, the succeeding President may alter the appointments of only
two of the five permanent members, leaving the remainder to continue as mem-
bers of the board. It provided that none of the board members could remain in
office for more than three consecutive terms. This system, therefore, guarantees
continuity in bank policy while safeguarding it from the influences of political
change ensuring greater credibility. These five members do not hold any other
employment.
45. See CCN, supra note 39, at art. 373.
46. See Alberto Alesina et. al., The Central Bank in Colombia (Nov. 2000), http://
www.iadb.org/regions/re3/SecColl.pdf; see also Sergio Clavijo, Central Banking
and Macroeconomic Coordination: The Case of Colombia (Sept. 2000), http://
www.banrep.gov.co/docum/ftp/borral59.pdf; Mauricio Cdrdenas & Zeinab
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compelled to give a report to the Congress on the execution of the poli-
cies for which it is responsible and on other matters requested from it.''4 7
The Colombian Banking Superintendence controls and conducts supervi-
sion on the banking activities of the central bank.
48
It is important to point out that in Colombia, this structure was created
with the aim of providing independence to the Central Bank from the
government. The Colombian Constitutional Court, however, has played
an important role in shaping the power and the authority of the bank's
board of directors not only by declaring unconstitutional the Main Arti-
cles of Law 32 of 1992, but also by revising important regulation issued by
the board.4 9 This intervention by the Court has been highly controver-
sial, especially during 1999 and 2000-a period marked by a severe finan-
cial crisis in the country.
In sum, the authority of the board of directors of the bank is deter-
mined by the Colombian Constitution, and its function is developed by
the Colombian Congress through the Central Bank Law. The board has
to consider the control that the Constitutional Court may exercise on its
decisions. In addition, it is influenced by the general economic policies of
the government as well as the ability of the Minister of Finance who
chairs the board and the Directors appointed by the government.
In Ecuador, the powers of the central bank as a monetary and ex-
change authority are limited because of the Dollarization program intro-
duced in 2000 by the Mahuad and Noboa administrations. 50 This was a
desperate measure to control inflation and to provide quick stabilization
to a volatile macroeconomic environment by introducing the dollar as the
legal tender in Ecuador. 51 According to Patino, the "ongoing Dollarisa-
tion process is the recognition of the State's failure to achieve political
independent monetary control due to interminable interference by partic-
Partow, Does Independence Matter? Case Studies from Colombia (Inter-American
Dev. Bank, Office of Chief Economist Working Paper No. r-341, 1998)
idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument. aspx?docnum=787941.
47. See CCN, supra note 39, at art. 371.
48. Id. at art. 372; see also LBRC, supra note 41, at art. 17; Estatuto Org6nico del
Sistema Financiero (EOSF), art. 325(2)(c).
49. See, e.g., Colombian Constitutional Court Decision C-485/93, (1993); C-383/99
(1999); C-481/99 7 (1999); C-208/00 (2000); C-700/00 (1999); C-955/00 (2000); C-
024/93 (1993).
50. See Ley para la Transformaci6n Econ6mica del Ecuador [Dollarization Statues]
(better known as the "Trolebus Law"); see also Ley de Regimen Monetario y
Banco del Estado arts. 70-71. It is important to note that at the time of writing, the
constitution of Ecuador is about to be changed by a National Constitutional As-
sembly summoned by President Correa.
51. See Maria Laura Patino, Lessons of the Financial Crisis in Ecuador 1999, 7 LAW &
Bus. REV. AM. 589, 589-91 (2001); see also Carlos J. Emanuel, Dollarization in
Ecuador: a Definite Step Toward a Real Economy (Feb. 2002), http://www.
comunidadandina.org/ingles/documentos/documents/ecuadollar.htm, (last visited
Apr. 8, 2008); Kenneth P. Jameson, Dollarization in Ecuador: A Post-Keynesian
Institutionalist Analysis, (Univ. of Utah, Dep't of Econ. Working Paper Series, Pa-
per No.5, 2004), available at http://www.econ.utah.edu/activities/papers/
2004_- 05.pdf; Steve H. Hanke, Money and the Rule of Law in Ecuador, 6 POL'Y
REFORM 131, 131-45 (2003).
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ular economic interests. '52
The Law of Economic Transformation of 2000 established a compre-
hensive program of reform. This law gave official status to the Dollariza-
tion of the Ecuadorian economy creating a system with no independent
monetary and exchange rate policy. It was expected that under the dol-
larization scheme, the focus of attention would be the implementation of
an adequate fiscal policy, and, in turn, would be able to protect the econ-
omy from external shocks.53 The Executive Decree No. 1589 of June 13,
2001 comprises the Organic Statute of the Central Bank that determines
the new mission and duties of the Bank.5 4 The board of directors is ac-
countable to the President and to the Ecuadorian Congress. It is obli-
gated to report to them every six months. 55
"The purpose of the [Peruvian Central] Bank is to preserve monetary
stability. '5 6 It is a jurisdictional person governed by "public law with au-
tonomy within the framework of" the Organic Law of the Central Bank
of Peru.57 This Organic Law exclusively governs the bank's autonomy,
purpose, and functions.5 8 It has its own capital and an indefinite term.
The bank's functions59 are to regulate currency and credit in the finance
system, to administer international reserves under its management, to is-
sue notes and "coins, and report on national finances. '60 In general, the
Bank is prohibited from conceding financing to the state treasury. 61
A Directorate of seven members governs the bank. The board of di-
rectors is the highest institutional authority. 62 The Executive Power
designates four members, including the President of the bank. The Con-
gress ratifies the four executive appointees and elects the remaining three
members. The three members have to be elected with an absolute major-
ity of the legal number of Congressional members. All directors are
nominated for a constitutional period corresponding to that of the Presi-
dent of the Republic. 63 As for accountability and supervision, the Bank
52. Patino, supra note 51, at 623.
53. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., INVESTMENT POLICY REVIEW: ECUA-
DOR (2001), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipcmisc2-en.pdf, (last visited Apr. 5,
2008).
54. CENTRAL BANK OF ECUADOR, FUNCIONES DEL BANCO CENTRAL DEL ECUADOR
EN DOLARIZACION OFICIAL DE LA ECONOMIA (2001), http://www.bce.fin.ec/docu-
mentos[ElBancoCentral/Funciones/FuncionesBCE.pdf, (last visited Aug. 8, 2008).
55. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR art. 263.
56. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 84 [hereinafter PCP]; see also Ley Organ-
ica del Banco Central de Reserva del Peru [LOBCP] art. 2. The law determines
the monetary system of the Republic.
57. LOBCP, supra note 56, at art. 1.
58. Id. at art. 3.
59. Id. at art. 2.
60. Id. Article 86 of the 1993 Political Constitution of Peru (PCP) establishes that the
emission of bills and coinage is within the exclusive power of the State. This power
is exercised through the Central Reserve Bank of Peru. PCP, supra note 56, at art.
86.
61. For other prohibitions, see LOBCP, supra note 56, at arts. 77-85.
62. Id. at art. 8.
63. See PCP, supra note 56, at art. 86; see also LOBCP, supra note 56, at arts. 8-31.
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must inform the country of the state of the national finances, 64 the board
of directors is obligated to submit a report to the Minister of Economy
and Finance,65 and any of the board members can be removed by the
Congress.66 The bank is subject to further control by the Comptroller
General solely in matters concerning the execution of its budget.67 The
Superintendence of Banking and Insurance supervises the enforcement
of the regulations concerning the Bank. 68
The constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela establishes
that "the fundamental objective of the Venezuelan Central Bank is to
achieve price stability and [to] preserve the internal and foreign exchange
value of the monetary unit."'69 The Central Bank is an institution gov-
erned by public-law, "with . . . autonomy to formulate and implement
policies within its sphere of competence. 7 0
In order to provide for the adequate attainment of its objective, the
functions of the Venezuelan Central Bank ... include those of for-
mulating and implementing monetary policy, participating in the de-
sign and implementation of foreign exchange policy, currency
regulation, credit and interest rate, administrating international
reserves and any others established by law.71
It "perform[s] its functions, in coordination with [the] general eco-
nomic policy, in the interest of attaining the higher objectives of the State
and the Nation. '7 2
The Venezuelan Central Bank [is] governed by the principle of pub-
lic responsibility... [to that end, it] render[s] an accounting of its ac-
tions, goals and the results of its policies to the National Assembly,
in accordance with the law. . .The Venezuelan Central Bank is sub-
ject to [ex post] oversight... by the Office of the General Comptrol-
ler of the Republic and inspection and supervision by the public
entity that supervises the banking [sector]. 73
In the sub-region, the Law of the Central Bank of Venezuela is the
regulation that most clearly grants formal independence to the central
bank.74 According to it, the central bank is a legal entity of public law
that is a part of the national authority, with constitutional rank and full
public and private capacity. 75 Article 2 establishes that in the perform-
64. PCP, supra note 56, at art. 84.
65. LOBCP, supra note 56, at art. 94.
66. PCP, supra note 56, at art. 86.
67. LOBCP, supra note 56, at art. 95.
68. Id. at art. 96.
69. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPIBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA art. 318, trans-
lated in UNIV. OF RICHMOND CONSTITUTION FINDER (unofficial translation), http://
confinder.richmond.edu/ [hereinafter CBRV]; see discussion infra part III.
70. CBRV, supra note 69, at art. 318.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at art 319
74. See infra note 92.
75. Estatudo del Banco Central de Venezuela [LCBV] art. 1.
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ance of its duties, the Central Bank of Venezuela is not subject to the
guidelines issued by the executive. 76 Its main purpose is to achieve price
stability and preserve the currency value.77 The bank is allowed to make
and implement policies within its scope of it authority, and performs its
duties in a coordinated manner with the general economic policy.78
Interestingly, a duty of the bank is to contribute to the Latin American
and Caribbean integration by establishing necessary mechanisms to expe-
dite coordination of macroeconomic policies. 79 In the same vein, the
Venezuelan Constitution provides that in the event a common currency is
instituted within the framework of Latin American and Caribbean inte-
gration, it is permissible to adopt the currency provided for by a treaty
signed by the Republic. 80 This is the only regulation in the sub-region
that takes into consideration the commitments undertaken by the govern-
ments in the Andean Community and foresees the possibility of attaining
further economic integration.
Overall, apart from Bolivia, the Andean central banks are entities with
constitutional status and separated from the executive power. All An-
dean countries recognize their central bank or the board of directors of
the bank as the monetary, exchange, and credit authority with the excep-
tion of Ecuador because of its dollarization program. The central bank is
a legal entity with its own resources, governed by public law, and with
some degree of formal independence. Its main purpose is to preserve
monetary stability and control inflation by retaining the purchasing
power of the currency. The Congresses of all Andean countries have
shaped the functions and powers of their central banks by issuing law that
establishes the institutions' authority. The Andean central banks are ac-
countable to their local Congresses by means of reporting their activities.
These common features certainly reveal a certain degree of harmonized
structural and legal treatment of the Andean central banks. They also
confirm the importance of the rule of law as a means for ring-fencing key
structures and institutions at a domestic level from political interference.
In terms of structural reforms up to 2005, the Andean presidents
showed great diligence in the introduction of constitutional and legal re-
forms aimed at granting independence to the Andean central banks and
establishing clear rules regarding their responsibility and the scope of
their duties in relation to macroeconomic policies. Certainly, the rule of
law served to ring-fence all these processes against political risk. There-
fore, it was more difficult for the Andean governments to interfere with
76. Id. at art. 2.
77. Id. at art.5.
78. MARIANA NIENSTAEDT & DENIRCE ZERPA, EL MARCO INSTITUTIONAL DEL
BANCO CENTRAL DE VENEZUELA: UN ANALISIS DESE EL ENFOQUE DE LA
ECONOMIA NEOINSTITUTIONAL (2005), available at http://www.eumed.net/libros/
2005/mndz/.
79. See LCBV, supra note 75, at art. 6. It is important to note that Venezuela withdrew
from the Andean Community and the G-3 in 2006, and joined MERCOSUR.
80. See CBRV, supra note 69, at art. 318.
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the technical work of the central bankers aimed at gaining
macroeconomic stability. But, there are some countries pulling out from
these reforms. This is the focus of the following part.
TABLE NO. 3 REFORMS AIMED AT GRANTING
INDEPENDENCE TO THE CENTRAL
BANKS UP TO 2005
Central Bank ECUADOR
Independence BOLIVIA COLOMBIA Dollarization PERU VENEZUELA
Constitutional Amend- X X X X
ment 1991 1998 1993 1999
[371] [261] [84] [318]
Law of the Central Bank X X X X X
1995 1992 2001 [2006] 1993
Central Bank is an Insti- Part of X X X X
tution of the State: Public the Exec-
Law Applicable utive
Accountable to the Con- X X X
gress
Part of the Government X
Accountable to the Gov- X X X
ernment
In Charge of Monetary, X X X X
Credit and Exchange Poli-
cies
Independent Budget, X X X X X
technical and administra-
tive autonomy
Specific Mandate to Pre- X X X X
serve Monetary Stability
Prohibition to Extend X X X X X
Credit or to Guarantee
Public Sector
To work in coordination X X X X X
with the general economic
policies
In charge of payment sys- X X X X X
tems
It is not submitted to the X X
government guidelines
Directorate or Board X X X X X
P+5 [P] 7 M 5M 7M 7M
P + 6 [P-C] [4P-3C] P + 6
III. WHAT IS GOING ON AFTER 2005? A TENDENCY TO
REDUCE CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN THE
ANDEAN COUNTRIES
The time period spanning from 2005 to 2007 has been a decisive period
in the modern history of Latin America. Determinant events in the polit-
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ics of the region seem to have changed the approach of Latin American
countries to regionalism and multilateralism, in addition to economic and
social policies. Certainly, there is something going on in the region that is
difficult to grasp at first glance. The change has been gradual. It is politi-
cally oriented because it appears to be the region's reaction to decades of
implementation of questionable imported economic policies and failed
models of development.
In the 1980s, the Washington Consensus was formed 81 and, because of
it, by the middle 1990s it was possible to talk about a hemisphere-wide
consensus (Cuba notwithstanding) in favor of free markets and liberal
democracy. It seems that in the 2000s, a Latin American consensus is
rising: It is time to look for other forms of financing the needs of the
countries, it is time to try to be autonomous in economic decisions. There
is nothing wrong with growing up. What concerns everyone involved is
how.
Hugo Chavez, the President of Venezuela, has been influential in ef-
fecting these changes in the region. Among others, such effect occurs
when the political tendency in the region leans to the left. An increasing
number of Latin American countries are electing left-wing parties that
are gaining more presence in congress or are actually getting access to the
executive power.
Certainly, the Latin American political map has changed as twelve of
the region's countries82 held presidential elections between November,
2005 and December, 2006. There are at least seven left-wing govern-
ments ruling important countries of the region- Argentina, Brazil, Bo-
livia, Ecuador, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The latest elections held
in Peru and Mexico also demonstrate the importance of left-wing move-
ments in Latin America. The institutional uncertainty experienced in
Mexico after the 2006 elections, exacerbated by the decision of the candi-
date of the left to create a parallel government, 83 is a worrying demon-
stration of the penetration and support given by the Mexican population
to this political option.
81. The 1980s witnessed the collapse of the major Latin American economies. The
United States used these circumstances as a means of imposing economic ortho-
doxy on the Latin American economies. John Williamson coined as "Washington
Consensus" a set of economic reform policies that contains "fiscal discipline; more
public expenditure in education and health; tax reform; market-determined inter-
est rates; competitive exchange rates; liberal trade policies; openness to direct for-
eign investment; privatization; deregulation;[and] respect for property rights." Ugo
Panizza & Eduardo Lora, Structural Reforms in Latin America under Scrutiny 23
(Inter-American Dev. Bank Working Paper Series, Paper No. 1012, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubS-108.pdf.
82. These countries are Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, Colombia,
Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela.
83. "Presidential runner-up Andr6s Manuel L6pez Obrador said he would create an
'alternate government,' calling Calder6n an 'illegitimate president." Wash-
ingtonpost.com: Mexico Votes, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/mexicovotes/
(Sept., 6, 2006, 09:22 EST).
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Overall, these left-wing governments focus on social programs in edu-
cation, land reform, and healthcare. Therefore, social issues are being
emphasized by broadening state help to the poorest families through
pooling public money for programs that alleviate extreme poverty. 84 Are
such policies sustainable? Would they only mean a short-term solution to
the poor as they leave aside important structural reforms? What are the
macroeconomic and fiscal implications of these programs? These ques-
tions need to be addressed in order to make poverty mitigation more
than mere words.
At the same time, Latin America is becoming more independent from
IMF. Countries such as Argentina and Brazil have paid back their debts
or, as in the Colombian case, have ended the use of IMF's facilities for
the time being.8 5 This is one of the most important economic events in
the last two decades for these countries. It means that their fiscal,
macroeconomic, financial, and overall economic policies will not be influ-
enced by the IMF staff or otherwise subjected to any kind of conditional
prerequisites. In sum, Latin American countries are achieving indepen-
dence from one of the most influential international financial institutions.
At the same time, lead by the governments of Argentina and Venezuela,
the region is looking for an institutional replacement to the IMF's eco-
nomic activities. In this sense, some of the governments of the region
agreed on creating the Bank of the South, 86 with the goal of including
every nation of Latin America. This independence from the IMF may be
a mistake as a future economic crisis could prove, or it may mean the
most important economic decision in Latin America in the last decades.
It is too soon to assess the overall result of such independence. But it is
not naive to suspect that Latin American governments and central banks
are aware of the responsibilities of this move.
84. In Brazil there is the "Bolsa Familia" (family grant) program. As per the program,
the federal government guarantees forty-five dollars per month to poor citizens.
In return, the families must ensure that their children stay in school and follow a
prescribed course of vaccinations. BBC NEWS, Brazil Poor Feel Benefits of Lula's
Policies, Sept. 18, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5301240.
stm.
85. One of the most important pieces of economic news in the region is the increasing
independence of relevant Latin American countries from the IMF. The IMF's
presence in the region was used to coordinate and implement economic policies.
But during 2005-06, two of the IMF's largest debtors proclaimed an early repay-
ment. "Argentinean President N6stor Kirchner announced 15 December that Ar-
gentina would repay the entire $ 9.8 billion debt owed to the IMF through 2008.
Two days earlier, Brazil had declared an early repayment of its outstanding obliga-
tions to the IMF amounting to $ 15.5 billion." Bretton Woods Project, Latin
America sends IMF Packing (Jan. 23, 2006), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/
art-507679. In September 2006, Colombia ended its agreements with the IMF.
Venezuela is following the same path. In April 2007, the Venezuelan government
announced that it had paid off its debts to the IMF and the World Bank, therefore,
cutting its ties with the two institutions.
86. The leaders of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Ven-
ezuela met on December 9, 2007, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, to sign the charter
of the Bank of the South, as an alternative to the IMF and the World Bank.
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Does this mean that the region is growing up? The answer to this ques-
tion is far from clear. What is evident, however, from the point of view of
the external economic and trade policies of the Latin American nations is
the formation of two main blocks. The first block comprises of a group of
countries that have signed or are in the process of negotiating a Preferen-
tial Trade Agreement (PTA) with the United States and are looking to
the Pacific as a long-term project. All countries in Central America, the
remaining members of the Andean Community,8 7 and Chile, form a
block of countries with access to the Pacific. With regard to these coun-
tries, the strategy takes into account their proximity to the United States
as their main commercial partner as well as the potential of Asia as a
main future trade partner. The second block comprises countries not al-
igned with the policies of the United States. It follows the Brazilian and
Venezuelan lead and shares a common attitude of independence from
U.S. policies and closeness to Europe.
The formation of these two blocks is transforming the region's tradi-
tional approach to regionalism. For instance, Venezuela suddenly with-
drew from the Andean Community, the oldest sub-regional economic
integration scheme in South America. The Andean Community was
deeply affected by this impulsive withdrawal. 88 In addition, Mercado
Coman del Sur (MERCOSUR), the most promising sub-regional integra-
tion scheme of the 1990s, seems to be losing its internal cohesion because
Uruguay is starting negotiations with the United States towards a PTA,
and the group has been affected by the entrance of Venezuela as a new
full member.89
All these transformations are going on without affecting the U.S. policy
in the region. The old backyard approach seems to remain in place even
though President Bush came into office declaring that Latin America was
a priority. After the attacks of 9/11, the fight against terrorism has fo-
cused the attention of U.S. policy makers on regions other than Latin
America. Despite the strong impulse given by President George H.W.
Bush to economic integration with Latin America in the 1990s through
the Enterprise of the Americas Initiative, the launch of the North Atlan-
87. Except for Bolivia. Bolivia is land-locked and its actual government is close to
President Chavez.
88. The Venezuelan government announced its intention to come back to the Andean
Community under the compliance of certain conditions that will study jointly with
the governments of Bolivia and Ecuador, and will inform to the other country
members by the end of 2007. It did not happen.
89. The incorporation of Venezuela as a full member of MERCOSUR is still waiting
for approval from the legislatives of Brazil and Paraguay. The congresses of Ar-
gentina and Uruguay have already voted for such incorporation. In October 2007,
there were exchanges between Caracas and Brasflia when Venezuelan president
Hugo Chavez called Brazilian Senators "Washington parrots and oligarchs." The
Brazilian Congress reacted saying it would delay consideration of the Venezuelan
Mercosur Incorporation Protocol. Chavez, in turn, warned that Venezuela would
not crawl or beg to become a member of Mercosur and set December, 2008, as a
deadline for the approval of the incorporation documents. Newsroom, Despite
Lula's Pressure Brazil Congress Drags Feet on Venezuela Affair, BRAZZIL MAG.,
Oct. 1, 2007, available at http:l/www.brazzilmag.com/content/view/8716/54/.
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tic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) process, and the commitment of
thirty-four democratically elected heads of government to the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA), what we have witnessed in the recent
years is an unexpected change in the North American trade policies to-
wards Latin America. The Central American Free Trade Agreement was
only narrowly ratified by the US Senate in 2005, the FTAA process is
stalled, the U.S. Congress is unwilling to supply the President with Trade
Promotion Authority, and the disintegration of a bipartisan free trade
bloc is denying Colombia the chance of having a PTA with the United
States, notwithstanding the fact that this Latin American country is one
of its closest allies in the Region.
Without any doubt Latin America is transforming. What will be the
final outcome of these changes? Would it mean an independent and ma-
ture region? Or would it create more political and economic uncertainty
as the region's governance seems to become more difficult? What would
be the best trade policy to be adopted by the Latin American countries
when the multilateral dimension is in crisis due to the freeze and possible
failure of the Doha round, the hemispheric regional and sub-regional
traditional schemes seem to be stalled as in the cases of the FTAA and
the Andean Community, and the bilateral strategy used by the U.S. trade
representative appears to come to an end due to the U.S. Congressional
opposition to it? How are these changes going to affect the Latin Ameri-
can citizenry?
The complexity of the circumstances described above and the implica-
tions of the questions suggested become more troubling if
macroeconomic instability issues come back into the scene. There are
two main branches of structural reforms being used to backpedal the in-
dependence of central banks. First, lead by the Bolivarian movement
(followed by Venezuela and echoed in Ecuador and Bolivia). The second
is developing in Colombia as an unwanted consequence of the reelection
of the actual President Uribe. These issues are the subject matter of the
following sub-sections.
A. THE REDUCTION OF THE CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN THE
BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION AND ALL ITS FRIENDS
As stated in part 11,90 in the Andean sub-region, the Law of the Central
Bank of Venezuela was the regulation that most clearly granted formal
independence to its central bank.9 1 This institution was established as a
legal entity of public law, part of the National Authority, with constitu-
tional rank, and full public and private capacity. In addition, the Central
90. See supra part II, notes 74-76.
91. This formal independence was diluting over time as the President has the power to
name four members of the Central Bank and the other two are name by the Na-
tional Assembly. At the end, due to the re-election of the actual president and the
overwhelming majority of the members of the National Assembly supporting the
Bolivarian revolution, the board lost in real terms its independence from the gov-
ernment. See supra part II.
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Bank was not subject to the guidelines issued by the executive. But, in
October 2007, the Venezuelan government passed in the National Assem-
bly a radical project to reform the Constitution. 92 One of the proposed
amendments abolishes the Independence of the Central Bank of
Venezuela.
According to the Article 318 of the proposal,
The national monetary system has to tend to achieve the essential
goals of the Socialist State and the well being of the people, above
any other consideration. The Executive Branch and the Venezuela
Central Bank, in strict and obligatory coordination, will fix monetary
policy and will exercise the monetary competence of the National
Power. The specific objective of the Venezuelan Central Bank,
jointly with the Executive Branch, is to attain price stability and pre-
serve the internal and external value of the monetary unit. The mon-
etary unit of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the Bolivar. In
the case that a currency is established in the framework of Latin
American and Caribbean integration, that currency that is the sub-
ject of treaties subscribed by the Republic can be adopted. The Ven-
ezuelan Central bank is public law entity without autonomy for the
formulation and exercising of the corresponding policies and its func-
tions will be subordinated to the general economic policy and the
National Development Plan to reach the superior objectives of the
Socialist State and the greatest sum of happiness for all of the peo-
ple. For the adequate fulfilling of its specific objectives, the Central
Bank of Venezuela will have among its functions, shared with the
National Executive Power, those of participating in the formulation
and execution of monetary policy, in the design and execution of for-
eign exchange policy, in the regulation of the coinage, credit and fix-
ing interest rates.93
All reforms included by the government were approved by the National
Assembly. But, according to Article 344 of the Venezuelan Constitution,
such reforms must be approved by the citizens through a referendum.94
On December 2, 2007 Venezuelans citizens rejected the reforms.95 Not-
92. TEXTO DE LA REFORMA DE LA CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA
DE VENEZUELA [Proposed Constitutional Amendment] art. 318, available at http:/
/www.venezuelareal.org/dpdf/TEXTODEFINITIVOREFORMA.pdf; for unof-
ficial translated version, see Venezuela's Constitutional Reform, http://constitu-
tional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/articles-318-320-and-321-miguel-
octavio.html (Oct. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Unofficial Translation, Proposed Venezue-
lan Constitution].
93. Unofficial Translation, Proposed Venezuelan Constitution, supra note 92, at art.
319.
94. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/ConstitutionsNenezuela/venl999.html.
95. For reactions of the media on this news, see e.g., Associated Press, Chavez loses
constitutional vote, MSNBC, Dec. 3, 2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/22066948/; Simon Romero, Venezuela Hands Narrow Defeat to Chavez Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, available at http:/www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/world/
americas/03venezuela.html?_r=l&oref=slogin; Associated Press, Venezuela's Cha-
vez Defeated in Bid for Indefinite Re-election, Sweeping Reform, Fox NEWS, Dec.
3, 2007, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,314584,00.html.
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withstanding the rejection, President Chavez vowed to pursue his agenda
through other channels. 96
Bolivia, in turn, has a new Constitution approved in December 2007.97
According to the new rules, the state, through the executive, will establish
the objectives of the monetary and exchange policies, in coordination
with the Central Bank of Bolivia. 98 Although the central bank has ad-
ministrative and technical autonomy,99 it is attached to the executive.
The bank's main function is to keep the value of the local currency. 1°°
Five members of the board of directors are named by the President, cho-
sen from a list of three candidates provided by the National Assembly. 10 1
As acknowledged in part II, in Ecuador, the power of its central bank
as a monetary and exchange authority are limited due to the Dollariza-
tion program introduced in 2000. As of the time of writing this article,
Ecuador is under a process of Constitutional Reform. The likelihood of
restating the local currency as a legal tender, however, is very small. In
this sense, keeping a dollarized economy will mean no monetary author-
ity for the central bank. It is important to take into account that Presi-
dent Correa in Ambato, Ecuador, on November 12, 2007, said that the
independence of the Central Bank must come to an end. "I advised Pres-
ident Chavez on this issue.'10 2 Correa also declared in Quito, Ecuador,
on January 10, 2008 that "it is time to recover sovereignty over national
economic policies: no more IMF or World Bank dictating them."10 3
As displayed in table four, from 2006 onward, there has been signifi-
cant rise in inflation in Bolivia and Venezuela, whereas inflation in other
Andean countries are below two digits.104
96. See BBC NEWS, Chavez defeated over reform vote, Dec. 3, 2007, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7124313.stm.
97. See El Pais, La Asamblea Boliviana Aprueba la Constitucion Impulsada Por Evo
Morales, Nov. 25, 2007, available at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/
Asamblea/boliviana/aprueba/Constitucion/impulsada/Evo/Morales/elpepuint/2007
1125elpepuint_1/Tes.
98. ASAMBLEA CONSTITUYENTE art. 326 (Bolivia). The constitution keeps the Central
Bank attached to the economic policies designed by the executive.
99. Id. at art. 327.
100. Id.
101. Id. at art. 329(I).
102. Presidencia de la Repdiblica del Ecuador, El Banco Central Volverd a Servir a Los
Intereses de la Naci6n, GOBIERNO NACIONAL DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR,
Nov. 12, 2007, available at http://www.presidencia.gov.ec/noticias.asp?noid=1165
5&hl=true. As stated before, the reform proposed by President Chavez was ex-
tremely radical. An example is the authority of the Central Bank in terms of mon-
etary policy.
103. Presidencia de la Reptiblica del Ecuador, El Presidente Anuncia Recuperaci6n de
la Soberana en la Politica Econ6mica, GOBIERNO NACIONAL DE LA REPUBLICA
DEL ECUADOR, Jan. 10, 2008, available at http://www.presidencia.gov.ec/
noticias.asp?noid=12289&hl=true.
104. Ecuador has dollarized its economy so monetary policy does not depend on the
Ecuadorian Central Bank.
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B. THE REDUCTION OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE DUE TO
PRESIDENTIAL REELECTION IN COLOMBIA
The constitution of Colombia established an independent central bank
from the government subject to its own legal regime.' 0 5 The board of
directors of the Columbian Central Bank is composed of seven mem-
bers-the Minister of Finance who is the chairperson,1 06 the governor of
the bank, elected by the Board, and five permanent, full-time members
who are appointed by the President of the Republic for four-year terms.
When the new Constitution was put in place, it was agreed that at the end
of the first four-year term, the succeeding President may alter the ap-
pointments of only two of the five permanent members, leaving the re-
mainder to continue as members of the board. As a result, only three
members of the board would be directly influenced by the government.
This system was aimed at guaranteeing continuity in bank policy while
safeguarding it from the influences of political change ensuring greater
credibility.
But, these safeguards to political intrusion were changed by Acto
Legislativo No. 2 of 2004107 that introduced the reelection of the presi-
dent. Originally, the reelection of a president was not authorized by the
Colombian Constitution, as some experiences in the Colombian history
showed that reelected presidents tend to remain in power and, eventu-
ally, become or act like a dictator. The introduction of the reelection has
an impact on the independence of the central bank as the reelected presi-
dent can have a great influence in macroeconomic policies. In the second
105. See CCN, supra note 39, at art. 371.
106. See supra, note 40.This appointment is aimed at harmonizing the policies of the
Bank and those of the Government.
107. Acto Legislativo 2 de 2004 (Columbia), available at http://www.secretariasenado.
gov.co/leyes/ACL02004.HTM.
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term, the president will name two other members of the board. So, out of
seven members, the president will have influence over five members-the
Minister of Finance, two members appointed during the first term, and
two members appointed in the second term. Only two members will re-
main independent. 10 8
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has pointed out that one of the main policies suggested by
the Washington Consensus was to gain macroeconomic stability in Latin
America. As shown in part II, it was achieved by means of establishing
independent central banks through structural reforms that were carried
out during the 1990s. Accordingly, inflation was significantly reduced in
the region. As seen in part III, Latin America seems to be divided in two
main blocks with different political and economic approaches. At the
same time, there is no agreement on the economic policies to be imple-
mented in the region as was the case in the 1990s as a consequence of the
Washington Consensus. In addition, the role of the IMF and the World
Bank is not clear because of the increasing criticism faced by these inter-
national financial institutions in recent years. Nowadays, the conditional-
ity clause is not the main tool used by the IMF to implement the "most
suitable economic policies" in the region. As it was said before, there is
no consensus any more. Besides, the tendency appears to be that fewer
countries in Latin America will be using IMF facilities. This means less
influence of the IMF in the region. In addition to these complexities,
there is a trend to reduce or even to remove autonomy of the central
banks.
Taking into consideration these circumstances, we need to be prag-
matic, creative, and stay alert. If there is no political will to implement
policies that are related to the Washington Consensus in some influential
countries in Latin America, the answer, then, appears to be in the strate-
gic institutions acting in the region and sub-regions. Thus, the Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) or Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) can play a crucial role. These institu-
tions could make convergent the approaches present in Latin America by
means of dialogue and serious economic research. At the same time, if
governments in the region can "re-control" the central banks without fis-
cal discipline, an important inflationary crisis could be possible in the fu-
108. President Uribe has been successful in his policy of Democratic Security. FARC
guerrilla has been controlled and its power diminished. Consequently, the popu-
larity of the President has reached levels not seen before. There are some voices
asking for a second re-election that will mean a third period in office. If this hap-
pens, among other consequences, the actual President will have full control on the
board of the central bank. In order to keep the country secure, the government
has to spend lots of money in the army. At the same time, it has structured inter-
esting social programs that need to be funded. In addition, there is a demanding
bureaucracy to be attended in order to pass acts and regulation. These circum-
stances pressure for fiscal expenditure that in the end will mean inflation. With
control over the Central Bank inflation in Colombia may increase.
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ture. In this sense, it is important to keep an eye on the issue of the
central bank independence that has become a nuisance to governments
prone to expend more than they should. Otherwise, we will witness the
return of the living inflation.
